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The Re-Emergence of Previously Slayed Metis Rights-Denial Dragons: The 
Dangers and Duplicity in Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v 
Alberta 
Abstract 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its unanimous reasons for judgment in R v Powley. 
Powley was—and remains—the high court’s only consideration of Métis rights, as “[A]boriginal rights,” 
protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In addition to setting out the legal test for the 
establishment of Métis section 35 rights, Powley slayed a multitude of Métis rights denial dragons that 
had emerged over the generations, including two of the dragons most often relied on by governments: (1) 
that difficulties in identifying Métis rights-holders, and, (2) competing Métis representation claims made 
Crown inaction in relation to Métis rights justifiable. Instead of accepting these arguments, the SCC in 
Powley recognized a positive Crown duty to negotiate with the Métis. The author, who is a Métis lawyer 
that has been involved in much of the Métis rights litigation and negotiations that have occurred over the 
last seventeen years, argues that Powley and this duty have been effectively leveraged by rights-bearing 
Métis communities from Ontario westward to secure several significant negotiated agreements as well as 
keep most of the slayed Métis rights denial dragons at bay. This article goes on to review a disconcerting 
2016 decision of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench on Métis consultation, which, if applied further, has 
the potential to re-invigorate these most duplicitous dragons. In Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta 
Local #125 v Alberta, while the trial judge recognized that Métis harvesting rights had been 
accommodated in the Fort Chipewyan area, the court accepted the Alberta government’s arguments that 
difficulty in identifying the “proper rights-holder” and the potential of competing Métis claims were 
justifications for Crown inaction and its position of consulting with no Métis whatsoever. The author 
argues that the court’s flawed reasoning in Fort Chipewyan turns Powley and the Crown’s positive duties 
owing to the Métis on their head as well as has the potential to see the two above-noted Métis rights 
denial dragons take flight again. 
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In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its unanimous reasons for judgment in 
R v Powley. Powley was—and remains—the high court’s only consideration of Métis rights, as 
“[A]boriginal rights,” protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In addition to setting 
out the legal test for the establishment of Métis section 35 rights, Powley slayed a multitude 
of Métis rights denial dragons that had emerged over the generations, including two of the 
dragons most often relied on by governments: (1) that difficulties in identifying Métis rights-
holders, and, (2) competing Métis representation claims made Crown inaction in relation to 
Métis rights justifiable. Instead of accepting these arguments, the SCC in Powley recognized 
a positive Crown duty to negotiate with the Métis. The author, who is a Métis lawyer that has 
been involved in much of the Métis rights litigation and negotiations that have occurred over 
the last seventeen years, argues that Powley and this duty have been effectively leveraged 
by rights-bearing Métis communities from Ontario westward to secure several significant 
negotiated agreements as well as keep most of the slayed Métis rights denial dragons at bay. 
This article goes on to review a disconcerting 2016 decision of the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench on Métis consultation, which, if applied further, has the potential to re-invigorate 
these most duplicitous dragons. In Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v Alberta, 
while the trial judge recognized that Métis harvesting rights had been accommodated in the 
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IN 2003, THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (SCC) released its unanimous reasons 
for judgment in R v Powley.1 Powley is the frst—and currently the only—SCC 
case dealing specifcally with the recognition and afrmation of the “[A]boriginal 
rights” of the Métis protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 While 
other SCC cases round out the high court’s consideration of Métis-specifc 
legal issues,3 Powley remains as a foundational precedent within modern Métis 
1. 2003 SCC 43 [Powley]. Jean Teillet from our frm was counsel for the Powleys from 
trial to the SCC. 
2. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
3. See e.g. R v Blais, 2003 SCC 44 [Blais] (dealing with whether the Métis are included in the 
term “Indians” in Manitoba’s Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930); Alberta (Aboriginal 
Afairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, 2011 SCC 37 [Cunningham] (addressing 
the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the membership 
requirements of the provincial legislation that created the Alberta Métis Settlements); 
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (AG), 2013 SCC 14 [MMF] (dealing with the 
application of the honour of the Crown to the land grant promises made to the Manitoba 
Métis through section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870); Daniels v Canada (Indian Afairs 
and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 [Daniels] (addressing the determination of 
whether the Métis are included as “Indians” within the meaning of section 91(24) of the 
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law, which is now a well-established component of Canadian Aboriginal law.4 
Despite having several opportunities to revisit or elaborate on Powley over the last 
seventeen years, the SCC has repeatedly refused to do so.5 
Powley’s enduring legacy is that it slayed many of the Métis rights denial 
dragons that had created a “legal lacuna” with respect to the Métis and their 
rights.6 Tese dragons were repeatedly used by Crown actors as justifcations for 
denial, inaction, and delays in recognizing or respecting Métis rights. Some of the 
most destructive of these dragons included the following refrains: the Métis were 
not here at “contact” and so the Métis do not have any section 35 rights; whatever 
rights the Métis have derive from their First Nation ancestors and can only be 
exercised at their discretion; Métis are merely mixed-ancestry individuals so they 
cannot hold collectively-held rights; section 35 was simply a political promise 
to the Métis and does not protect any substantive constitutional rights; dealing 
with the Métis is too complex and challenging, and so the Crown is entitled to 
do nothing until the courts recognize Métis rights. 
In addition to slaying these dragons, Powley set out the legal test Métis 
communities from Ontario westward have repeatedly turned to—and successfully 
relied on—to advance their claims in the courts, leverage negotiation processes 
with the executive branches of governments, and secure Métis rights recognition 
or accommodation agreements. Some of these successes include: further judicial 
recognition of Métis harvesting rights in southern Manitoba (2008),7 southeast 
Saskatchewan (2007),8 northwest Saskatchewan (2005),9 and central Alberta 
4. Troughout this article, I refer to “Aboriginal law” as the law developed by Canadian courts 
in relation to Indigenous peoples, including decisions related to section 35. Aboriginal law 
is diferent than “Indigenous law,” which refers to the jurisdictions and laws of Indigenous 
peoples. Modern Métis law, as a component of Aboriginal law, is distinct from the laws, legal 
orders, and jurisdiction of the Métis as an Indigenous people. 
5. R v Hirsekorn, 2013 ABCA 242 [Hirsekorn CA], leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed; 
Corneau v Procureure générale du Québec, 2018 QCCA 1172, leave to appeal to the 
SCC dismissed [Corneau]; Vautour v R, 2017 NBCA 21, leave to appeal to the SCC 
dismissed [Vautour]. 
6. Cunningham, supra note 3 at paras 7, 8, 70: “Although widely recognized as a culturally 
distinct Aboriginal people living in culturally distinct communities, the law remained blind 
to the unique history of the Métis and their unique needs. … Governments slowly awoke 
to this legal lacuna. … Te constitutional amendments of 1982 and, in their wake … signal 
that the time has fnally come for recognition of the Métis as a unique and distinct people.” 
7. R v Goodon, 2008 MBPC 59 [Goodon]. 
8. R v Belhumeur, 2007 SKPC 114 [Belhumeur]. 
9. R v Laviolette, 2005 SKPC 70 [Laviolette]. 













(2010);10 negotiated agreements on Métis harvesting rights in Ontario (2004 and 
2018),11 Manitoba (2012),12 and Alberta (2019);13 an interim reconciliation plan 
between the federal Crown (Canada) and the Manitoba Metis Federation (MMF) 
in 2018;14 and, three self-government agreements signed between Canada and 
the Métis Nation of Ontario (MNO), the Métis NationSaskatchewan (MNS), 
and Métis Nation of Alberta (MNA) in 2019.15 
While there is undeniably much more work to be done and the agreements 
noted above are far from perfect, signifcant progress has been made based on 
leveraging the legal framework in Powley. Quite frankly, the agreements noted 
above would have been unimaginable prior to 2003. I say this and write this 
10. R v Hirsekorn, 2010 ABPC 385 [Hirsekorn PC]. While the defendant in Hirsekorn PC was 
ultimately unsuccessful in establishing a Métis hunting right in the Cypress Hills area of 
Alberta, the trial judge did recognize “[t]he evidence has shown that an historical Métis 
community existed in the region of what is present day Edmonton and district” (ibid at 
para 115). In addition, as further discussed in this article, the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
in Hirsekorn CA, recognized “the historical rights bearing communities of the plains Métis 
are best considered as regional in nature, as opposed to settlement-based,” which resolved 
one of the fundamental disputes between the Alberta government and the Métis in Alberta 
(Hirsekorn CA, supra note 5 at para 63). 
11. Framework Agreement on Métis Harvesting between Métis Nation of Ontario and Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, 30 April 2018, online (pdf ): <www.metisnation. 
org/media/654740/metis-harvesting-framework-agreement.pdf> [perma.cc/JV7U-9XBM]. 
12. Points of Agreement on Métis Harvesting in Manitoba between Manitoba Metis Federation and 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Manitoba, 29 September 2012. 
13. Métis Harvesting Agreement between the Métis Nation of Alberta and Her Majesty the Queen 
in Right of the Province of Alberta, 12 March 2019, online (pdf ): Métis Nation of Ontario 
<albertametis.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Harvesting-Agreement_SIGNED.pdf> 
[perma.cc/PJ3T-6GNS] [MNA–Alberta Harvesting Agreement]. 
14. See Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Afairs Canada, News Release, 
“Manitoba Metis Federation and Government of Canada announce joint action plan 




15. See Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Afairs Canada, News Release, “Historic 
self-government agreements signed with the MNA, the MNO and the MNS” (27 
June 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/en/crown-indigenous-relations-northern-afairs/ 
news/2019/06/historic-self-government-agreements-signed-with-the-metis-nation-of-
alberta-the-metis-nation-of-ontario-and-the-metis-nation-saskatchewan.html> [perma. 
cc/7LB8-JAK8]. For an example of one of these Metis Government Recognition and 
Self-Government Agreements (MGRSAs), see Métis Government Recognition and 
Self-Government Agreement between Métis Nation of Alberta and Canada, 27 June 2019, 
online (pdf ): <albertametis.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-06-27-MNA-MGRSA-
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article as one of the Métis lawyers involved in all the above-mentioned litigation 
and who participated in negotiations both prior to and following Powley.16 
I am not an academic or an outside commentator, but I am Métis and have 
been in the courtrooms, at the negotiation tables, and, in attendance at Métis 
assemblies, where these issues have been or are being addressed in real time. 
As this article and others in this special issue detail, Canadian Aboriginal 
law, at this moment in time, is largely irreconcilable with Indigenous jurisdiction 
and laws. Tis is all too evident to Indigenous lawyers. In practicing Canadian 
Aboriginal law, we often have to rely on the legal fctions the courts have created or 
propose new ones that will be acceptable to Canadian judges in order to advance 
our peoples’ rights, interests, and claims. Tese constructs are often imperfect, 
and rarely align with Indigenous peoples’ own laws or how our people may 
choose to exercise their inherent jurisdiction and rights if free from the constructs 
and constraints of the Canadian legal system. Like many Indigenous lawyers who 
need to respond to their client’s immediate needs and goals, I often do not have 
the luxury of sacrifcing progress in the name of perfection when our own people 
are being charged and harassed for exercising their constitutionally-protected 
rights, when resource development projects threaten Indigenous lands, culture, 
and way of life or when leaders want to see tangible results for their people. 
My contribution to this special issue focuses on the re-emergence of one of 
the most duplicitous Métis rights-denial dragons that was slayed by the SCC in 
Powley. In Powley, the SCC rejected the Ontario government’s argument that 
it was justifed in denying Métis harvesting rights because it was too difcult 
to identify Métis rights-holders or to deal with competing Métis representation 
claims. In slaying this dragon, the SCC held that “the difculty of identifying 
members of the Métis community must not be exaggerated as a basis for defeating 
their rights under the Constitution of Canada” and directed governments to get 
on with negotiations to “more clearly defne the contours of the Métis right to 
hunt.”17 Te Métis harvesting agreements noted above, which include rights 
16. I acted as legal counsel in Laviolette, Belhumeur, Goodon and Hirsekorn. My co-counsel on 
these cases included Jean Teillet, Clem Chartier, and Michelle LeClair-Harding. I have also 
appeared for Métis clients in all of the Métis-specifc cases heard by the SCC since 2003, was 
counsel for the MNO, MMF, and MNA in reaching their harvesting agreements, counsel for 
the MMF in reaching its interim reconciliation plan with Canada announced in 2018, and 
counsel for the MNO and MNA in their self-government negotiations with Canada. 
17. Powley, supra note 1 at paras 49-50. 










recognition and accommodation agreements,18 demonstrate this was not an 
impossible task, if governments sit down and negotiate with Métis. 
Unfortunately, this Métis rights-denial dragon has recently reemerged in 
Alberta, in a mutated form. Tis time the rights-denial is in the context of the 
provincial Crown refusing to consult with any Métis, even after it has recognized 
a historic and modern day Métis community in a given area for the purposes of 
a Métis harvesting right in a provincial policy. Even more troubling is that this 
dragon has now found some judicial support in Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of 
Alberta Local #125 v Alberta.19 In Fort Chipewyan, Justice Goss of the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench acknowledged there was sufcient evidence that the 
Métis community in the Fort Chipewyan area had a prima facie rights claim that 
met the frst branch of the SCC’s test to trigger the Crown’s duty to consult;20 yet, 
Justice Goss accepted the Alberta government’s (Alberta) argument that it had no 
positive duty to work with or negotiate with the Métis to identify who should be 
consulted because of uncertainty with respect to who represented the rights-holder 
and competing Métis representation claims. Sounds familiar, doesn’t it? 
In this article, I argue that Justice Goss’s disregard of Alberta’s reciprocal and 
positive obligations fowing from a prima facie Métis rights claim is at odds with 
Powley, the Crown’s duty to negotiate, and the very purpose of the Crown’s duty 
to consult as set out in Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests).21 
Te upshot of Fort Chipewyan is that there is now a judicially acknowledged 
prima facie Métis harvesting right in the Fort Chipewyan area,22 but absolutely 
no one needs to be consulted with respect to potential adverse impacts to that 
right by provincial Crown actions. Further, the court essentially relieves Alberta 
from all of its corollary obligations and duties owing to the Métis fowing from 
this prima facie right. Instead of recognizing Alberta is obligated to negotiate, or, 
at the very least to attempt to identify who should be consulted, Alberta is able to 
rely on its own inaction to not consult with any Métis whatsoever. Tis is the very 
18. In some of these negotiated harvesting agreements, governments have been willing to 
fully recognize the existence of the rights at issue. In others, governments accommodate 
credibly asserted Métis rights based on policy approaches or agreement on how the 
Crown will conduct itself. Tis is the diference between rights recognition versus rights 
accommodation agreements. 
19. 2016 ABQB 713 [Fort Chipewyan]. In this article, I refer to Justice Goss in Fort Chipewyan
as “the court.” 
20. Ibid at para 365; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 
[Haida]. Troughout this paper when I refer to the Crown duty to consult, it includes the 
corollary duty to accommodate. 
21. Ibid. 
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defnition of an Aboriginal right proving to be hollow due to a refusal to identify 
or recognize a rights-holder. 
Tis article highlights the legal inconsistencies, faws, and dangers in the Fort 
Chipewyan decision. In so doing, it contributes to this special issue’s theme that the 
jurisprudence on identifying rights-holders can often result in Aboriginal rights 
being rendered meaningless. Te article begins with an overview of some historical 
context and judicial determinations in Powley, including the Métis rights-denial 
dragons Powley slayed, the judicially-created “proper rights-holder” conundrums, 
and the how the Crown’s duty to consult relates to these conundrums. Te article 
then provides an overview of the Fort Chipewyan case and shows how the court 
resurrects the previously slayed dragon which allows Crown inaction to justify 
a complete denial of Métis rights. Te article concludes by arguing, based on 
Powley and other recent SCC jurisprudence, that this Métis rights-denial dragon 
cannot be allowed to resurface. 
I. THE POWLEY CASE 
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT FOR THE POWLEY CASE 
While many Métis had hoped that express Métis inclusion in section 35(2) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 would lead to meaningful negotiations, agreements, 
settlements, and modern day treaties on Métis lands, rights, and self-government, 
those hopes were dashed after the constitutional conferences in the 1980s 
(mandated by section 37 of the Constitution Act, 1982) failed to defne the rights 
in section 35, and after the Charlottetown Accord—which included the celebrated 
Métis Nation Accord—was defeated in a referendum in October 1992.23 
After 1992, Canada, the provinces from Ontario westward, and the Northwest 
Territories (the public governments who were parties to the Métis Nation Accord), 
largely walked away from the multilateral process and commitments contained 
within the Accord. As a result of these actions and the lack of political will on the 
part of these governments to exercise their prerogative powers and negotiate on 
23. “Proposed Métis Nation Accord” in Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, vol 4 (Canada Communication Group, 1996), Appendix 5D at 252-58 [RCAP
Métis Perspectives]. 
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Métis rights issues, Métis began to explore the use of harvesting rights “test cases” 
in order to give meaning to the promise of section 35.24 
Te frst of these Métis harvesting rights test cases was R v Morin & Daigneault
out of northwest Saskatchewan.25 Te defendants were successful at trial and the 
frst level of appeal; however, the Saskatchewan government did not appeal the 
case further, and so it would not be the frst Métis section 35 rights case to reach 
the SCC. Around this same period, Powley—a similarly framed Métis harvesting 
rights test case in the Upper Great Lakes region of Ontario—would not receive 
the same pass from the Ontario government. Although the Powleys were equally 
successful at trial and the frst level of appeal, the denial of Métis rights in Ontario 
was well-entrenched in the politics of the day and the then-Premier of Ontario 
vowed to appeal the case all the way up to the SCC. Tis set the stage for Powley
to become the frst Métis section 35 harvesting rights test case to reach the SCC. 
B. THE POWLEY TEST AND THE SLAYED MÉTIS RIGHTS DENIAL DRAGONS 
On 22 October 1993, Steve Powley and his son Roddy killed a bull moose just 
outside Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. Tey tagged their catch with a Métis card 
and a note that read the moose was to provide meat for winter.26 One week 
later, the Powleys were charged by provincial Conservation Ofcers for hunting 
moose without a licence and unlawful possession of moose contrary to Ontario’s 
Game and Fish Act.27 
Te MNO, which had recently formed as a Métis-specifc government in 
the province of Ontario and was brought into the Métis National Council as 
a governing member, advanced and fnancially supported the Powley case as a 
Métis harvesting rights test case. Notably, during this same period, the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples released its fnal report which concluded that 
it was “indisputable” that there were distinct Métis communities in Ontario and 
that “[t]he Métis community at Sault Ste. Marie, a hub of early fur-trade activity, 
has a particularly long and eventful history.”28 
Over the next decade, three levels of Ontario courts, and, fnally, the SCC, 
all concluded that the Powleys were exercising a collectively-held Métis right to 
24. For a discussion on the litigation strategy developed, see Jason Madden, “Daniels v. 
Canada: Understanding the Inkblot from a Métis Nation Perspective” in Tomas Isaac, 
ed, Key Developments in Aboriginal Law (Tomson Reuters Canada, 2019) at 93 [Madden, 
“Daniels v. Canada”]. 
25. [1996] 3 CNLR 157 (Sask Prov Ct) [Morin & Daigneault]. 
26. Powley, supra note 1 at para 4. 
27. RSO 1990, c G1 as repealed by Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, SO 1997, c 41. 
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hunt for food, protected by section 35. Te SCC ultimately concluded that the 
Sault Ste. Marie Métis community held an Aboriginal right to hunt for food that 
was protected by section 35 and that Ontario’s blanket denial of Métis harvesting 
rights in the Game and Fish Act unjustifably infringed the Métis rights to hunt 
exercised by the Powleys.29 
Fundamental to the importance of Powley was the ten part test set out by 
the SCC for the establishment of Métis section 35 rights. Tis test “uphold[s] the 
basic elements of the Van der Peet test,” but “modif[ies] certain elements of the 
pre-contact test to refect the distinctive history and post-contact ethnogenesis 
of the Métis, and the resulting diferences between Indian claims and Métis 
claims.”30 In efect, the “contact” date in the First Nation context was changed to 
“efective control” for the Métis.31 
Since 2003, the Powley test, as it is now known, has been repeatedly relied 
upon by Métis communities outside of the Great Lakes region of Ontario to 
judicially establish or negotiate the recognition or accommodation of their Métis 
section 35 rights. As further discussed below, the Powley test has had to be stretched 
and adapted by courts in western Canada, Crown actors, and Métis governments 
alike, and yet, it has proven to be sufciently responsive and durable to deal 
with the diversity amongst Métis communities from Ontario westward. Granted, 
groups claiming Métis rights on the East Coast, in Quebec, in parts of Ontario, 
and in British Columbia have failed to meet the requirements of the Powley test.32 
Tese results, however, are due to the inability to demonstrate any collective 
identity as Métis—historically and consistently—or a lack of a sustained Métis 
presence—on the land—in a given region before efective control, as opposed to 
an inherent defect with the Powley test itself. 
In recognizing and afrming Métis rights, Powley slayed some of the Métis 
rights-denial dragons that were previously used to deny or diminish Métis rights. 
For example, the SCC in Powley refuted the following deeply fawed claims: section 
35 provides an afrmational statement to the Métis, but protects no substantive, 
existing Métis rights;33 the Métis are merely mixed-ancestry individuals and 
therefore do not possess collectively held Aboriginal rights, and thus any Métis 
claims could be addressed by dealing with them as a socio-economic disadvantage 
29. Powley, supra note 1 at para 55. 
30. Ibid at para 14. 
31. Ibid at para 37. 
32. See e.g. Vautour, supra note 5; Corneau, supra note 5; R v Babin, 2013 NSSC 434; 
R v Willison, 2005 BCPC 131, rev’d 2006 BCSC 985; R v Paquette, 2012 ONCJ 606. 
33. Powley, supra note 1 at paras 13, 17. 










population or as individuals;34 any rights the Métis have are derivative or in 
other words fow their First Nation ancestors as opposed to inhering in the Métis 
as a distinct Aboriginal communities or as a people;35 in areas where historic 
treaties had been negotiated, Métis harvesting rights do not exist, have been 
“extinguished,” or are inferior to treaty rights;36 and Métis do not have the same 
special relationship to the land that other Aboriginal peoples do.37 
Powley’s clarity on these points has proven to be an efective and durable 
shield—and sword—to keep many of the Métis rights-denial dragons at bay. 
One of the most disingenuous Métis rights-denial excuses made by governments 
was that difculty in identifying Métis rights-holders or representatives of Métis 
rights-holders justifed denying the recognition and afrmation of Métis section 
35 rights.38 Essentially, governments attempted to rely on their historical denial of 
the existence of Métis rights, as well as their ongoing indiference and inaction in 
recognizing Métis governance structures, as reasons courts should not recognize 
and afrm Métis rights. Tis argument amounts to the refrain that dealing with 
Métis rights is too confusing and too difcult. 
In slaying this dragon, the SCC held that “the difculty of identifying 
members of the Métis community must not be exaggerated as a basis for defeating 
their rights under the Constitution of Canada” and that “[t]he development of 
a more systematic method of identifying Métis rights-holders for the purpose 
of enforcing hunting regulations is an urgent priority.”39 Tis conclusion and 
direction from the SCC reinforced the Ontario Court of Appeal’s similar 
conclusion that “[t]he government cannot simply sit on its hands and then 
defend its inaction because the nature of the right or the identity of the bearers of 
the [Métis] right is uncertain.”40 
Notably, following Powley, Ontario accepted this direction and ultimately 
reached a harvesting agreement with the MNO in 2004 and an additional 
agreement in 2018 (with several disagreements along the way including 
34. Ibid at paras 10, 29. 
35. Ibid at para 14. 
36. Ibid at paras 46, 50. 
37. Ibid at para 50. 
38. Troughout the Powley litigation, the Ontario government argued that because there 
was no list of Métis maintained by the federal government, it was impossible for them to 
recognize any Métis rights-holders in Ontario. Te province also argued that because there 
was no generally accepted defnition of Métis and there were competing entities claiming to 
represent Ontario Métis, it was justifed in recognizing no Métis rights-holders whatsoever. 
39. Powley, supra note 1 at para 49. 
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additional litigation).41 Other governments from Ontario westward have similarly 
engaged in negotiations with Métis and reached agreements recognizing or 
accommodating Métis rights.42 Tese agreements demonstrate that negotiating 
with Métis regarding their section 35 rights is not an impossible task. As the SCC 
observed, it is not, in fact, too difcult once the Crown is no longer able to rely 
on the Métis rights-denial dragons to justify its inaction and refusals to negotiate. 
Te SCC’s recognition in Powley of the Crown’s positive obligation to 
negotiate with Métis when asserted, accommodated, or established rights are at 
stake was not an anomaly. In 2016, the SCC reafrmed in Daniels the conclusion 
that Powley, along with other Aboriginal law decisions, “already recognize a 
context-specifc duty to negotiate when Aboriginal rights are engaged.”43 Tis 
Crown duty, while having limited judicial consideration to date, arguably creates 
a positive obligation on the Crown to negotiate with Aboriginal communities who 
have credibly asserted, accommodated, or recognized rights claims.44 As further 
support for this positive Crown duty, the SCC also cites Haida and Tsilhqot’in 
Nation v British Columbia;45 however, the SCC provides no pinpoint citations in 
those cases for this proposition.46 I would suggest this duty is encapsulated in the 
following paragraph from Haida:47 
Te potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Te honour of the Crown requires that these rights be 
determined, recognized and respected. Tis, in turn, requires the Crown, acting 
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. 
In Tsilhqot’in, the SCC reafrmed this paragraph from Haida, holding that “the 
Crown ha[s] not only a moral duty, but a legal duty to negotiate in good faith to 
resolve land claims.”48 
Unquestionably, the SCC’s directions in Powley, Haida, and Tsilhqot’in
impose positive obligations (i.e., a legal duty) on the Crown to engage, negotiate 
with, and arrive at accommodations or agreements with the Métis when credibly 
asserted, accommodated, or recognized section 35 rights are engaged. Tis, 
41. R v Laurin, 2007 ONCJ 265. 
42. See text accompanying notes 12-15. 
43. Daniels, supra note 3 at para 56. 
44. For a discussion on the potential implications and use of the Crown’s duty to negotiate, see 
Madden, “Daniels v. Canada,” supra note 24 at 107-109. 
45. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in]. 
46. Daniels, supra note 3 at para 56. 
47. Haida, supra note 20 at para 25. 
48. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 45 at para 17. 













however, frst requires answering the question of who is the rights-holder in 
the Métis context? 
C. WHO IS THE RIGHTS-HOLDER? THE “PEOPLE” VERSUS “COMMUNITY” 
QUANDARY 
Like other Indigenous peoples recognized in section 35(2), the Métis have 
also repeatedly run up against the courts refusing to undertake a “peoplehood” 
analysis in the interpretation of their section 35 rights. Despite section 35(1)’s 
recognition and afrmation of the rights of the “aboriginal peoples of Canada,” 
the courts—in particular in regulatory prosecution proceedings dealing with 
individuals asserting collectively-held aboriginal or treaty rights49—have limited 
their fndings of facts and conclusions to making a determination about a smaller 
rights-bearing sub-group such as a community, Band, or First Nation.50 
In Powley, the litigants specifcally limited their harvesting right claim to 
the Métis community in and around Sault Ste. Marie, which led the SCC to 
conclude that “[i]t is not necessary for us to decide, and we did not receive 
submissions on, whether this community is also a Métis ‘people,’ or whether 
it forms part of a larger Métis people that extends over a wider area such as 
the Upper Great Lakes.”51 Other Métis litigants in western Canada, however, 
have repeatedly advanced their cases based on a broader Métis community or the 
Métis Nation—as a distinct Aboriginal people—being the proper rights-holder. 
To date, all attempts seeking recognition of the larger people as the relevant Métis 
rights-holder have been unsuccessful. 
49. I would also suggest that, increasingly, the choice of the litigation forum where an 
Aboriginal rights claim is being advanced (i.e., within a regulatory prosecution versus a 
civil claim) contributes to how robust a court’s consideration of a larger rights holder will 
be. In a regulatory prosecution, a court is ultimately answering the question of whether the 
defendant possesses an Aboriginal right in the specifc location where they were charged. 
In resolving these sorts of prosecutions, I have found the reluctant of judges to engage in 
broader considerations of the rights-holder or the extent of the traditional territory of the 
rights-holder. For better or worse, in civil claims, judicial consideration of these issues is more 
engaged and extensive. See e.g. Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 56 at 
para 11; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at paras 142-44. 
50. See Larry Chartrand, “Te Constitutional Determination of a Métis Rights-Bearing 
Community: Reorienting the Powley Test” in Karen Drake & Brenda L Gunn, Renewing 
Relationships: Indigenous Peoples and Canada (Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre, 
2019) 169 at 171-74; Karen Drake, “Who Are the Métis? Te Role of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent in Identifying a Métis Rights-Holder” in Dwight Newman & Ibironke 
Odumosu-Ayanu, eds, Indigenous-Industry Agreements, Natural Resources, and the Law
(Routledge, 2020). 
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In Hirsekorn,52 despite forty-two days of trial that included voluminous 
amounts of evidence about the mobile Métis bufalo hunters of the Plains and 
the network they built throughout the prairies as well as a notice of constitutional 
question that identifed the Métis Nation as the rights-holder, the Alberta Court 
of Appeal “decline[d] to make a determination with respect to whether there 
was only one, prairie-wide Métis community during the relevant time period.”53 
In Belhumeur,54 the Saskatchewan Provincial Court dealt with the litigant’s claim 
that the Métis Nation or a Métis community spanning the parklands/grasslands 
was the relevant historic and contemporary Métis community as follows:55 
Te Crown submits that the Supreme Court clearly contemplated that Metis rights 
are possessed by individual Metis communities which make up the Metis Nation 
or the Metis people, not the Nation or the people themselves. … I agree with the 
position of the Crown. Powley makes it clear that rights are possessed by individual
communities that may make up a nation. 
Tis conclusion in Belhumeur clearly overstates what the SCC actually held in 
Powley. Te SCC did not undertake a peoplehood analysis because it was not 
asked to and did not need to. Like the Mìgmaq and other First Nation people, the 
Métis have similarly faced an unwillingness from the courts to approach section 
35 from a peoplehood perspective. While Powley slayed some Métis rights-denial 
dragons, it left this particular issue unaddressed. Tus, according to the current 
state of the law, section 35 rights—at least with respect to harvesting rights that 
have been judicially recognized—are held by Métis communities. 
D. WHO IS THE RIGHTS-HOLDER? THE “COMMUNITY” CONUNDRUM 
Tis then brings us to another conundrum created in the Métis jurisprudence: 
What is the geographic scope of a rights-bearing Métis community? Te SCC 
in Powley provides a relatively simple and straightforward defnition of Métis 
community: “A Métis community can be defned as a group of Métis with a 
distinctive collective identity, living together in the same geographic area and 
sharing a common way of life.”56 And yet, the last seventeen years of litigation 
and negotiations demonstrates that answering this question is anything but 
simple or straightforward. 
52. Hirsekorn PC, supra note 10. 
53. Hirsekorn CA, supra note 5 at para 64. 
54. Belhumeur, supra note 8. 
55. Ibid at para 201, 203 [emphasis added]. 
56. Powley, supra note 1 at para 12. 








Following Powley, many interpreted the case as recognizing only the Sault 
Ste. Marie Métis community as the rights-holder, meaning the community was 
the settlement of Sault Ste. Marie proper and the harvesting territory of this 
community was likely a small circle (maybe ffty to one hundred kilometres) 
surrounding Sault Ste. Marie. Most governments seized upon the term 
“site-specifc” and adopted a narrow (and incorrect) understanding of the 
recognized Métis community in Powley.57 In fact, because Steve and Roddy 
Powley were hunting just outside of Sault Ste. Marie, the scope and distance of the 
Sault Ste. Marie Métis community’s harvesting right received little consideration 
at trial or on appeal. 
Based on this “site specifc” interpretation, government ofcials from Ontario 
westward brought forward negotiation proposals to identify settlements “like the 
Powley community” by locating dots on a map and then suggested drawing circles 
around those dots (encompassing maybe ffty to one hundred kilometres) to 
delineate the harvesting areas for these communities. Tis de minimus approach 
to the recognition of Métis harvesting territories and section 35 rights was 
summarily rejected by the Métis, which ultimately led to other the Métis rights 
test cases in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Te decisions in these cases 
reveal that the initial interpretations of Powley by governments were incorrect. 
While the rights-bearing collective in Powley may be conveniently described 
as the “Sault Ste. Marie Métis community,” the evidence at trial established a 
regional community that dispersed from Sault Ste. Marie proper following land 
speculation and unfulflled land-related promises from Treaty Commissioner 
Robinson. Tis very issue was squarely before the trial judge and he rejected the 
Crown’s arguments that the geographic scope of the “community” should be 
narrowly defned:58 
Te Crown has gone to great pains to narrow the issues in this trial to Sault Ste 
Marie proper. I fnd that such a limited regional focus does not provide a reasonable 
frame of reference when considering the concept of a Métis community at Sault 
Ste Marie. … Te lifestyle of the Métis more closely resembled the Indians that 
occupied this area and it would seem more reasonable to fnd the existence of the 
Métis on the fringes of the geographical boundaries of Sault Ste Marie … including 
57. Ibid at paras 12, 19. It must be emphasised that references to site-specifcity in Powley
refer to the nature of the right itself (i.e., where it can be exercised), and not to the nature 
of the Métis community (i.e., it is not the case that a Métis community must be a single 
Settlement). For an analysis of the Crown’s site-specifc approach, see Chartrand, supra
note 50 at 174-77. 
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Batchewana, Goulais Bay, Garden River, Bruce Mines, Desbarates, Bar River, St. 
Joseph’s Island, Sugar Island and into Northern Michigan. 
Based on these fndings of fact, the trial judge held that, at a minimum, the 
“rights-bearing Métis community” extended hundreds of kilometres to the east, 
north, and west of Sault Ste. Marie, spanning almost twenty thousand square 
kilometres on the Canadian side and going into northern Michigan. Tese 
fndings were ultimately upheld by the SCC:59 
Te trial judge found that a distinctive Métis community emerged in the Upper 
Great Lakes region in the mid-17th century, and peaked around 1850. We fnd no 
reviewable error in the trial judge’s fndings on this matter, which were confrmed 
by the Court of Appeal. 
… 
Dr. Lytwyn concluded from this census data that “[a]lthough the Métis lost much 
of their traditional land base at Sault Ste. Marie, they continued to live in the region 
and gain their livelihood from the resources of the land and waters” (Lytwyn Report, 
at p. 32). 
… 
Te trial judge’s fnding of a contemporary Métis community in and around Sault 
Ste. Marie is supported by the evidence and must be upheld. 
Laviolette was the frst case to apply the new Powley test. 60 Te defendant, Mr. 
Laviolette lived in Meadow Lake, Saskatchewan. He had extensive ancestral 
connections to Métis throughout Saskatchewan. He was charged for fshing in 
Green Lake, which is approximately ffty kilometres northeast of Meadow Lake. 
Te Crown’s arguments in this case were threefold: (1) Métis communities are 
discrete physical settlements like villages and towns; (2) neither Meadow Lake 
nor Green Lake was a rights-bearing Métis community; and, (3) if either Green 
Lake or Meadow Lake was a rights-bearing Métis community, each was a distinct 
Métis community; therefore, since Mr. Laviolette lived in Meadow Lake and was 
fshing in Green Lake, he could not exercise a “Green Lake Métis community’s” 
harvesting right. 
Te trial judge rejected all of the Crown’s arguments and adopted an approach 
that there was a “regional” rights-bearing community throughout northwest 
Saskatchewan that included Meadow Lake, Green Lake, Île-à-la-Crosse and 
extended into Alberta (Lac La Biche)—an area spanning well over forty thousand 
59. Powley, supra note 1 at paras 21, 26, 28. 
60. Laviolette, supra note 9. 









square kilometres.61 In addressing the issue of whether Green Lake was a distinct 
“Métis community” from other settlements where Métis lived in the region, 
Justice Kalenith wrote:62 
Both experts gave evidence showing that the regional unity was a highly established 
network based on trade and family connections. While the importance of a 
particular settlement fuctuated at diferent times, certain settlements remain fxed. 
Mr. Tornton testifed that “it’s very difcult to isolate Green Lake out of this and 
look at it as a separate little community. You’ve got to recognize this as part of 
a much larger network and a much larger sense of what is becoming a national 
identity” (of the Métis people). 
Within the larger network, certain fxed settlements developed as trade and 
transportation hubs. Dr. Tough described these fxed settlements as “nodes as part 
of a network where you have the need for extensive sort of operations of resources, 
collecting resources”. (Transcript, pp. 1286–1287). Te fxed settlements were 
connected by a transportation system of river routes, cart trails and portages. 
Constant movement between the fxed settlements allowed the Métis in the area 
to develop and maintain signifcant trade and kinship connections throughout the 
region and with the larger network of Métis people. 
Te trial judge not only recognized the Métis had developed a regional unity 
throughout northwest Saskatchewan, but alluded to the Métis developing a 
broader national identity—as an Aboriginal people—solidifed through trade and 
various institutions which supported their mobility and interconnectivity (e.g., 
the northern boat brigades, the Red River cart trails, and the bufalo hunts in 
the south) as well as through kinship connections all the way to the Red River.63 
In the end, however, the trial judge concluded that the Northwest Saskatchewan 
Métis community, which formed a large regional triangle anchored around 
Green Lake, Lac La Biche, and Île-à-la-Crosse—including Meadow Lake—was 
the rights-bearing Métis community.64 
Laviolette is an example of a case where, although a large, regional Métis 
community was recognized, a new legal fction was created in the process. Te 
regional Laviolette triangle could have just as easily been expanded to inter-link 
locations further north such as Bufalo Narrows and La Loche. Moreover, Lac 
La Biche’s central location interconnects to Métis living and moving along 
the North Saskatchewan River system as well as the Athabasca River. Tese 
“communities”—even when recognized as being regional in nature—often prove 
61. Ibid at paras 23-24, 27-30. 
62. Ibid at paras 25-26. 
63. Ibid at paras 24, 34. 
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to have arbitrary boundaries that fail to recognize how Métis populations overlap 
and are indivisible from each other because, very often, the same Métis families 
are living throughout these regions. It is also worth noting that the evidence in 
some of these cases demonstrate that many key Métis families in these regions do 
not ancestrally connect to the Red River Valley, but are rooted in these regions 
outside the Red River for generations, while intermarrying and arguably absorbing 
Métis from the Red River who may move into these regions at later dates. 
In Belhumeur, the courts took a similar regional approach to the identifcation 
of the Métis community at issue. Mr. Don Belhumeur, a Métis living in Regina, 
was fshing in the Qu’Appelle Valley near Lebret, approximately 85 kilometers 
from Regina. It was the Crown’s position that either Regina was not a Métis 
community or that Regina and Lebret were two distinct Métis communities. 
Similar to the Laviolette case, the trial judge relied on evidence that the Métis 
were a mobile people that were connected through extensive trade, institutions, 
and kinship connections:65 
Dr. Ray testifed that a regional Metis network with fxed settlements developed in 
the parkland and grassland areas, around the bufalo hunts and Red River cart trails. 
… 
Tese included Turtle Mountain, Moose Mountain, Cypress Hills, Qu’Appelle 
Valley, Dirt Hills, Wood Mountain and the Souris River. 
… 
Dr. Ray testifed that the nature of the fur trade and the nature of the Metis 
economy involved a great deal of mobility. A key component of their economy 
was hunting, trapping, fshing, working for the trading companies. He stated that 
these are all spatially extensive activities. He stated that the Metis community’s 
regional network included wintering sites, trading posts, areas close to cart trails and 
gathering places that allowed the historic parklands/grassland Metis community to 
develop a regional cohesion and maintain signifcant trade and kinship connections 
throughout the region. 
While, as noted above, the trial judge in Belhumeur rejected that the rights-holder 
was the Métis Nation or a rights-bearing Métis community that spanned the 
grasslands and parkland areas of the prairies, she ultimately found that there 
was a regional rights-bearing Métis community, which included the “Qu’Appelle 
Valley and environs” and extended to Regina.66 Tis “community” spanned 
roughly thirty-fve thousand square kilometres. 
65. Belhumeur, supra note 8 at paras 156, 158, 161. 
66. Ibid at para 167. 










In Goodon, the Provincial Court of Manitoba also adopted a regional 
approach to the identifcation of the rights-bearing Métis community at issue, 
including distinguishing it from the community recognized in Powley.67 Te 
trial judge rejected the provincial Crown’s position that the rights-bearing Métis 
community at issue in that case was limited to a ffty kilometre radius around 
Turtle Mountain and instead held:68 
Te Metis community of Western Canada has its own distinctive identity. As the 
Metis of this region were a creature of the fur trade and as they were compelled to 
be mobile in order to maintain their collective livelihood, the Metis “community” 
was more extensive than, for instance, the Metis community described at Sault 
Ste. Marie in Powley. Te Metis created a large inter-related community that 
included numerous settlements located in present-day southwestern Manitoba, into 
Saskatchewan and including the northern Midwest United States. 
… 
Tis area was one community as the same people and their families used this entire 
territory as their homes, living of the land, and only periodically settling at a distinct 
location when it met their purposes. 
Rather than accept that a potential break in Métis living at or using Turtle 
Mountain for a period of time resulted in there being no rights-bearing Métis 
community there, the trial judge identifed the larger region spanning most of 
southern Manitoba and extending into Saskatchewan and the United States as 
the geographic scope of the rights-bearing Métis community.69 He further held 
that “[a] local Métis community could be present at more than one settlement in 
a particular region”70 and recognized the community in Goodon spanned well over 
forty-fve thousand square kilometres and included over ten thousand people. 
While the defendant in Hirsekorn was ultimately not successful in establishing 
he had a Métis harvesting right in the Cypress Hills region near Medicine Hat, 
the Alberta courts in this case rejected the provincial Crown’s argument that 
Métis communities must be understood as settlement-based:71 
What is not clear on the evidence of this case, however, is whether there was 
essentially one regional Métis community across the prairies at this point in history 
(characterized by the appellant as the Métis of the Northwest), or more than one 
community encompassing slightly smaller regions. For instance, the reports of the 
67. Goodon, supra note 7. 
68. Ibid at para 46-47. 
69. Ibid at paras 33, 36-37. 
70. Ibid at para 34. 
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experts in this case speak of groups of Métis termed the “Red River Métis”, the 
“North Saskatchewan Métis” and the “American Métis”, although their evidence at 
trial shows some reluctance to classify these groups as diferent peoples. I conclude 
that the historical rights bearing communities of the plains Métis are best considered as 
regional in nature, as opposed to settlement-based. 
In addition, in considering whether Métis from Fort Edmonton—who 
participated in the bufalo hunts on the Plains—had harvesting rights that 
extended down to the Cypress Hills, the trial judge concluded as follows:72 
Te evidence has shown that an historical Métis community existed in the region 
of what is present day Edmonton and district. Tis group of North Saskatchewan 
Métis included the settlements of Fort Edmonton, St. Albert, Lac St. Anne, Victoria, 
Lac La Biche, and Rocky Mountain House. Te Métis people in this region had 
a distinctive collective identity, lived together in the same geographical area and 
shared a common way of life. 
So, what do these cases tell us about identifying the rights-holder in the Métis 
context? After over a decade of Métis rights litigation across the prairies, 
courts have repeatedly rejected a site-specifc or settlement approach to the 
identifcation of Métis communities. Tey have also rejected province-wide, 
prairie-wide, or nation-based Métis harvesting rights claims. In true middle of 
the road Canadian fashion, most courts have found a compromise by repeatedly 
recognizing Métis communities as “regional” in nature and scope, often spanning 
tens of thousands of square kilometres and crossing provincial and international 
boundaries (although their respective jurisdictions limit the enforceable efect of 
those determinations). 
While these recognized regional Métis communities are better than a 
settlement-by-settlement approach to Métis rights recognition, they are essentially 
just new legal fctions created by the courts, and sometimes proposed by the 
Métis themselves as calculated decisions to secure legal victories. Te regional 
approach fails to recognize the full historic and contemporary mobility, kinship, 
and interdependency of the Métis as a people and as interlinked and overlapping 
communities. For the better, the “site-specifc” and “settlement-based” dragons 
have arguably been slayed. However, the regional approach creates challenges 
in dealing with Métis mobility between the regional communities, and for 
regional communities that overlap so much that any line becomes arbitrary 
and problematic. 
With that said, the litigation expanding on Powley has, over almost two 
decades now, gradually assisted in moving governments away from a “dot 
72. Hirsekorn PC, supra note 10 at para 115. 









and circle” approach to the identifcation of Métis communities. As the three 
negotiated Métis harvesting agreements that are now in place in Ontario, 
Manitoba, and Alberta demonstrate, this regionality has been further expanded 
to include hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of territory where Métis 
are able to harvest without fear of harassment or charges. Although many Métis 
believe this regional patchwork is still too limiting and arbitrary, and undermines 
Métis nationhood, it is a vast improvement over the government positions taken 
in 2003 when the Métis rights-denying dragons still ruled the day. 
E. WHO NEEDS TO BE CONSULTED? THE “COMMUNITY” CONUNDRUM 
CONTINUED 
Te SCC case law is clear: Te Crown’s “duty to consult exists to protect the 
collective rights of Aboriginal peoples.”73 As such, “[the duty] is owed to the 
Aboriginal group that holds the s. 35 rights.”74 Based on the existing Métis case 
law, this likely means that the duty is owed to regional rights-bearing Métis 
communities, not an individual, a family, a single settlement, or a localized area 
that may be a part of a larger regional Métis community. Since Métis have not 
yet achieved modern day treaties that clearly defne the “rights-holder” for all 
purposes, the case law determines the likely “rights-holder” and who needs to be 
consulted in the Métis context. 
Simply put, it would be a fallacy to assume that in the Métis context, the 
proper rights-holder for Crown consultation is a single settlement or localized 
governance structure that does not track to the understanding of a rights-bearing 
Métis community pursuant to the Powley test. Te Crown’s duties to section 
35 rights-holders must align with the collective that holds those rights. Te 
assumption that Crown consultation could simply occur at a localized level, 
by looking for something equivalent to an Indian Act75 band (or dot-on-a-map 
settlement) in the Métis context makes no sense if the rights-holder is a larger 
regional Métis community. Moreover, as the case law referred to in the other 
articles in this special edition demonstrates, the assumption that Indian Act bands 
are always the proper rights-holder in a First Nation context is also questionable 
where historic or modern treaties identifying the rights-holders do not exist. 
Tese challenges can often be overcome through negotiated agreements 
between Métis and the Crown that clarify the community to be consulted. For 
example, many of the Métis governments discussed further below have through 
73. Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26 at para 30 [Behn]. 
74. Ibid. 
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their bylaws, oaths, or other means, obtained and set out express authorizations 
from all their members to advance their collectively held rights, regardless of what 
components thereof may ultimately be determined to be the proper rights-holder. 
Tis is one reason in favour of Crown consultation with these longstanding Métis 
governance structures. 
In addition, these Métis governments typically structure themselves to deal 
with Crown consultation based on the authorizations they have and through 
various parts of their governance structures working together. For example, the 
MMF has passed Resolution #8 which identifes its head ofce as the initial 
and central point of contact for Crown consultation with the Manitoba 
Métis community.76 Te MNO and MNA have each put into place Regional 
Consultation Protocols which set out how their local, regional, and provincial 
governance structures will work together on Crown consultation.77 While these 
Métis governance structures and consultation protocols are respected and used 
to varying degrees by the Crown, industry, and others, they undoubtedly work 
to facilitate and support “[t]he development of a more systematic method of 
identifying Métis rights-holders” noted as being a priority by the SCC in Powley.78 
II. THE FORT CHIPEWYAN CASE 
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT FOR THE FORT CHIPEWYAN CASE 
1. UNDERSTANDINg CONTEMPORARY MÉTIS gOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
In order to put the Fort Chipewyan case into context, a general understanding of 
contemporary Métis governance structures from Ontario westward is required.79 
Tese Métis governance structures have developed, advanced, and supported the 
Métis rights cases discussed above, which have fundamentally shaped modern 
Métis law. Tey are also the entities who have, for the most part, represented the 
76. “Understanding Resolution 8” at 15, online (pdf ): Manitoba Métis Federation <www.mmf. 
mb.ca/docs/2013-Resolution%208%20Booklet-VFinal.pdf> [perma.cc/78EG-QDSC]. 
77. See e.g. the “Metis Nation of Ontario Regional Consultation Protocols” (1 May 2020) 
online: MNO Reference Documents <www.metisnation.org/governance/reference-documents> 
[perma.cc/M63H-6CKH]. For a discussion of the MNO’s protocols regarding consultation, 
see Drake, supra note 50 at 13-18. 
78. Powley, supra note 1 at para 49. 
79. For a more detailed discussion on contemporary Métis governance structures see Jason 
Madden, “Te Métis Nation’s Self-Government Agenda: Issues and Options for the 
Future” in Frederica Wilson & Melanie Mallet, eds, Métis-Crown Relations: Rights, Identity, 
Jurisdiction, and Governance (Irwin Law, 2008); Kelly Saunders & Janique Dubois, Métis 
Politics and Governance in Canada (UBC Press, 2019). 








Métis in constitutional processes, in negotiations implementing Powley and other 
Métis rights cases, in Crown consultation, and in the delivery of programs and 
services to Métis citizens and communities in their respective provinces. Some of 
these governance structures, such as the MNA, are almost as old as the province 
they are situated in. 
For the purposes of this article, I refer to Métis governance structures such as 
the MNA, MNS, MMF, and MNO as “Métis governments.” While admittedly 
their legal and administrative arms are currently established under provincial 
legislation as “associations,” “secretariats,” or “corporations,”80 the legitimacy 
of these Métis governments comes from the mandates they receive from their 
members (i.e., citizens), their objectively verifable registries which identify 
legitimate Métis rights-holders, their democratic elections, and their longstanding 
recognition as the legitimate representatives of their respective constituencies. 
While Canadian law may not yet formally recognize them as Indigenous public 
governments, they are unquestionably Indigenous “representative institutions” 
as referred to in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.81 Moreover, I have always believed that the legitimacy of these Métis 
governments comes from their longevity and legitimacy in the eyes of the Métis 
people themselves, not from ultimately being recognized by other governments. 
80. It should be noted that many of these Métis governments were required by other 
governments to incorporate in the 1960s in order to access public government funding. 
Other governments required these governments to have legal status and capacity in Canadian 
law through some means. It is ironic that these incorporations are now used against them 
by some public governments to diminish their legitimacy as Métis governments. In Alberta, 
the Alberta Métis incorporated an “association” under Alberta’s Societies Act. In Manitoba, 
the Manitoba Métis incorporated the Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. In Saskatchewan, 
a society—the Métis Society of Saskatchewan—was created. In Ontario, the MNO 
incorporated a not-for-proft secretariat under Ontario’s Corporations Act. 
81. GA Res 295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/Res/61/295, arts 19, 
32 [UNDRIP]. Notably, in each of MGRSAs noted above, Canada, through negotiations 
between the Métis and the executive branch the federal government, recognized the 
“inherent right of selfgovernment that is protected by sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982” of the “Métis Communities Represented by the MNO,” the “Métis people of 
Saskatchewan,” and the “Métis Nation with Alberta” respectively. See MGRSA, supra note 
15 at 6; Métis Government Recognition and Self-Government Agreement between the Métis 
Nation of Ontario and Canada, 27 June 2019 at 7 , online (pdf ): <www.metisnation.org/ 
media/655331/2019-06-27-metis-government-recognition-and-self-government-agreement. 
pdf> [perma.cc/5XGL-D8Y3]; Métis Government Recognition and Self-Government Agreement 
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Over generations, these Métis governments have evolved—and continue 
to evolve—with democratic structures at the local (e.g., Locals), regional (e.g., 
Regional Councils, including regionally elected leadership), and provincial (e.g., 
a Provincial Council or Cabinet with provincially elected Presidents) levels, as well 
as at annual assemblies that allow all citizens to come together and receive updates 
on the activities of the government and engage directly in decision-making. 
Today, these Métis governments include unique and adaptive combinations 
of: historical aspects of Métis self-government (e.g., the use of assemblies for 
decision-making on signifcant issues, where each local community is represented 
through Locals similar to the historic parishes in the Red River area, et cetera); 
the use of union-style forms of organization; corporate structures; and some 
aspects of a Westminster model of government. Are they perfect? Absolutely not. 
But show me any government—Indigenous or non-Indigenous—that is. Most 
importantly, however, over the generations, these Métis governments have kept 
the goal of self-government and Métis rights alive. On this front, they have served 
the Métis well. Moreover, as all governments should, they continue to adapt to 
the needs of the citizens and the times. 
From a Métis perspective, the corporate legal realities of these Métis 
governments do not diminish their legitimacy any more than First Nation 
governments are diminished because they have had the Indian Act and the 
Band council system imposed on them by federal legislation. Many of the 
legal recognition challenges Indigenous peoples and their governments face 
today fow from a legacy of colonization, denial, and neglect. Tey are not of 
their own making and it is a constant struggle for Indigenous governments 
to maneuver through colonial laws and systems, government policies, and 
the courts in order to be fnally recognized as Indigenous governments on a 
nation-to-nation, government-to-government basis with the Crown as well as 
within Canada’s legal system. 
2. BACKGROUND ON THE FORT CHIPEWYAN CASE 
Te MNA is the result of over ninety years of Métis political organization and 
selfgovernment in Alberta. Today, it has over forty-six thousand registered Métis 
citizens, administers millions of dollars in programs and services annually to 
Alberta Métis,82 owns hundreds of buildings and homes throughout Alberta83 
82. Including through, for example, Apeetogosan (Métis) Development Inc, Rupertsland 
Institute, and Rupertsland Center for Métis Research. 
83. Including through MNA’s afliates, Métis Urban Housing Corporation and Métis Capital 
Housing Corporation. 













including a Métis interpretative centre called Métis Crossing, and has signed 
agreements with Canada on Métis access to federal parks, Crown consultation, 
and self-government.84 For the most part, the MNA has had a progressive and 
positive relationship with Alberta (although there have been peaks and valleys), 
which has been formalized through several framework agreements since the 
1990s with the most recent being signed in 2017 for a ten-year period.85 
As set out in the MNA bylaws, all MNA citizens voluntarily authorize the 
MNA to advance their collectively-held Métis rights, interests, and claims.86 
Consistent with a typical Métis governance structure discussed above, the MNA 
bylaws establish three levels of government which include: 
1. Local Councils (Locals) that include a President, Vice-President, 
Secretary, and Treasurer who are elected by members of the Local;87 
2. Regional Councils that include regionally elected Métis leadership 
(who also sit on the Provincial Council) as well as the Locals from 
within each of the MNA’s six Regions;88 and 
3. A Provincial Council that includes regionally and provincially 
elected leadership who are elected by MNA members every four 
years through province-wide ballot box elections.89 
While Canada has signed an agreement with the MNA on federal Crown 
consultation, provincial Crown consultation remains elusive. Alberta has 
established provincial policies for Crown consultation with First Nations and the 
84. Memorandum of Understanding between Parks Canada and MNA respecting Indigenous 
Peoples Open Doors Program, 31 July 2018, online (pdf ): <www.albertametisgov.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Parks-Canada-MNA-Open-Doors-Program_MOU_31July18. 
pdf> [perma.cc/4EMU-ZGKZ]; Consultation Agreement between the MNA and Canada, 
19 July 2018, online (pdf ): <www.albertametisgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ 
MNA_Canada-Consultation-Agreement-July-2019.pdf> [perma.cc/4274-CH9K]; 
MGRSA, supra note 15. 
85. See Framework Agreement between Alberta and MNA,1 February 2017, online (pdf ): <open. 
alberta.ca/dataset/eac3e6c9-e54f-4d4c-81f7-a47b8e39d7e9/resource/de6ebd40-9bbb-41ea-
8ec2-fa4f06ebf607/download/mna-framework-agreement-jan-31-2017.pdf> [perma. 
cc/6D7Y-9FTV] (as well as predecessor agreements). 
86. Bylaws of the MNA (updated 17 September 2019), Schedule A at 73, online (pdf ): 
<albertametis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Metis-Nation-of-Alberta-Bylaws-
Consolidated-Updated-September-17-2019.pdf> [perma.cc/UE9C-J7KV] [MNA Bylaws]. 
Courts in Alberta have also considered and confrmed this authorization. See McCargar v 
Métis Nation of Alberta Association, 2018 ABQB 553, af’d 2019 ABCA 172. 
87. MNA Bylaws, supra note 86, art 12.4. 
88. Ibid, art 12.3. 
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eight Alberta Métis Settlements,90 and yet of-Settlement Métis consultation does 
not occur and no comparable provincial policy exists. 
Despite this gap in relation to Crown–Métis consultation, Alberta has had 
a provincial Métis harvesting policy since 2007. Tis policy recognized “the 
eight Métis Settlements and… 17 [other] communities as both historic and 
contemporary Métis communities” for the purpose of Métis harvesting.91 Te 
MNA objected to the 2007 Harvesting Policy because it employed the technique 
discussed above of identifying “dots on a map” and then drawing arbitrary 160 
kilometre circles around those dots to identify Métis communities and their 
harvesting areas. Tis policy also involved Métis individuals applying to Alberta 
to be recognized as a “Métis harvester” under the policy, without any role for the 
MNA in identifying Métis harvesters. 
Despite the MNA’s objections, the 2007 Harvesting Policy remained in place 
until it was updated with the MNA’s participation and support in September 
2018 (with the new policy ofcially taking efect one year later in September 
2019).92 Te 2018 Harvesting Policy recognizes four large regional Métis 
communities and harvesting areas throughout the province and also resulted in 
a harvesting agreement being executed between the MNA and Alberta in March 
2019 that provides for the MNA to identify eligible Métis rights-holders and 
issue harvester stickers to its citizens under the policy.93 Despite this collaborative 
work on section 35 Métis harvesting rights—and the accommodation of those 
rights through this revised harvesting policy—Alberta continues to refuse to 
90. Te Government of Alberta’s First Nations Consultation Policy on Land Management and 
Resource Development (16 May 2005), online (pdf ): <open.alberta.ca/dataset/1006f6ce-
400c-4c5a-a21e-dcb511da66b4/resource/be9f23c6-cb3c-4abc-aeeb-5f8f82106b1c/ 
download/3118589-2005-frst-nations-consultation-policy-on-land-management.pdf> 
[perma.cc/46UK-V5NV]; Te Government of Alberta’s policy on consultation with Metis 
settlements on land and natural resource management, 2015 (amended 1 April 2020), 
online (pdf ): <open.alberta.ca/dataset/a13ecaac-117c-4760-bcb9-f1c7d4dd8497/ 
resource/767e1695-4299-4b08-a72b-e60aab1650d5/download/ir-policy-consultation-metis-
settlements-land-resources-2015-amended-2020.pdf> [perma.cc/QE7D-ABS4]. 
91. Alberta Environment and Parks, Métis Harvesting in Alberta (July 2007, updated June 2010), 
online (pdf ): <open.alberta.ca/dataset/57bdd5ba-d024-4c06-b3aa-b9cbf8c513ca/resource/ 
b0da0882-4ddc-4886-abc1-b6d3ab6f485e/download/metisharvestinginalberta-jun2010. 
pdf> [perma.cc/J5QU-UTXG] [2007 Métis Harvesting Policy]. 
92. Alberta Environment and Parks, Métis Harvesting in Alberta Policy (2018) (updated 
25 February 2019), online (pdf ): <open.alberta.ca/dataset/7763cb9c-9457-439b-
b206-f31d65156e9c/resource/d1c7a3d9-5a9d-4654-b745-cd4e7a64cedd/download/ 
metis-harvesting-in-alberta-2018.pdf> [perma.cc/UD7Y-32V9] [2018 Métis 
Harvesting Policy]. 
93. MNA–Alberta Harvesting Agreement, supra note 13. 








consult with the MNA in any way on resource development occurring in the 
province. Inexplicably, sixteen years after Haida, Alberta still has not undertaken 
a single Crown consultation with the MNA, its Regional Councils, or its Locals. 
Te Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 (MNA Local #125) 
is an MNA Local Council and a part of the MNA’s overall governance structure. 
Between 2007 and 2019, Fort Chipewyan was recognized as one of the seventeen 
Métis communities identifed in Alberta’s 2007 Harvesting Policy. MNA Local 
#125 brought forward the Fort Chipewyan litigation in its individual capacity. 
Neither the MNA, MNA Region 1 (the MNA Region where MNA Local #125 is 
located), or the MNA’s legal counsel94 actively participated in the litigation. Nor 
were the MNA’s bylaws, membership registration system, or authorization from 
its members vis-à-vis Crown consultation directly at issue in this case. 
Tis lack of collaboration and coordination between the MNA and MNA 
Local #125, as well as the gaps in the evidentiary record around membership and 
authorization that were readily apparent in Fort Chipewyan contributed to the 
court’s conclusion that MNA Local #125 was not authorized to represent the 
Fort Chipewyan Métis community for the purposes of Crown consultation.95 
Tat being said, this article focuses not on whether those determinations were 
correct, but rather on a legal issue that emerged upstream. Specifcally, given 
that Alberta had already recognized Fort Chipewyan as both a historic and 
contemporary Métis community for the purposes of Métis harvesting rights—and 
accommodated those harvesting rights in the 2007 Métis Harvesting Policy—the 
provincial Crown had a corresponding positive obligation to negotiate or, at the 
very least, attempt to work with the Métis to identify who does represent the Fort 
Chipewyan Métis community for the purposes of Crown consultation. 
Clearly, the 2007 Métis Harvesting Policy was based on some actual or 
constructive knowledge of a Métis community and credibly asserted Métis 
harvesting rights in the Fort Chipewyan area. As the discussion above demonstrates, 
the Crown is not in the habit of proactively recognizing or accommodating Métis 
rights based on good will. If Alberta had enough knowledge to accommodate 
Métis harvesting rights in this area, could it then sit on its hands and deny that 
any Crown consultation fows from these accommodated Métis rights? Based on 
Powley, the case law discussed above, and the facts of this case, I argue it could 
not. Alberta had—and has—a corollary duty to negotiate with Métis on these 
issues, which Fort Chipewyan completely ignores. 
94. I, along with our frm, have been the MNA’s long-standing legal counsel on Métis rights 
related issues, but played no active role in Fort Chipewyan. 
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B. OVERVIEW OF THE FORT CHIPEWYAN CASE 
1. WHAT WAS THE CASE ABOUT? 
Fort Chipewyan involved an application for judicial review fled by MNA Local 
#125 (referred to as the “Fort Chipewyan Métis Local” or “FCM Local” by the 
court) of Alberta’s decision made in 2015 that it did not owe MNA Local #125 
any Crown consultation with respect to the Teck Frontier oil sands mine project. 
Te Teck project was a proposed “truck-and-shovel” oil sands mine located about 
one hundred and ten kilometres north of Fort McMurray, in the Athabasca oil 
sands region of northeastern Alberta.96 
As noted above, Alberta’s 2007 Métis Harvesting Policy identifed Fort 
Chipewyan as both a historic and contemporary Métis community for the 
purposes of Metis harvesting rights. Te Teck project’s study area overlapped 
with the 160 kilometre radius harvesting area of the Fort Chipewyan Métis 
community. As is required for a project of this nature, Teck submitted a draft 
Aboriginal Consultation Plan for the project to Alberta in 2008.97 Teck’s 
proposed plan identifed MNA Local #125 in a list of Aboriginal communities 
that Teck proposed to consult with to the fullest extent provided for in the 
plan. Alberta, through Alberta Environment and Parks, reviewed Teck’s plan 
and informed Teck that MNA Local #125 had no legally established rights.98 
In response, Teck revised its Aboriginal Consultation Plan to state that “although 
Métis consultation requirements have yet to be clarifed by the Government of 
Alberta, Teck has included potentially afected Métis communities…as a matter 
of best practice.”99 
MNA Local #125 was actively involved in the environmental assessment 
process for the Teck project. Under Alberta’s regulatory regime, it submitted a 
Statement of Concern asserting that Métis rights to hunt, fsh, and gather would 
be adversely impacted by the Teck project, amongst other concerns. MNA 
Local #125 attempted repeatedly to meet with the Crown about these issues. 
On several occasions, Alberta requested information from the Local about its 
membership requirements, the geographic scope of the community that the Local 
purported to represent, and the historic Métis community (and communities) to 
which the Local’s members claimed ancestral connections, with a breakdown 
96. In February 2020, the Teck Project was ultimately shelved by the proponent for fnancial and 
regulatory reasons. 
97. Fort Chipewyan, supra note 19 at paras 6-10. 
98. Ibid at para 10. 
99. Ibid at para 11. 









of the membership’s ties to those communities. MNA Local #125 made several 
submissions to the Crown in attempts to respond to these questions.100 
After considerable correspondence back and forth between 2012 to 2015, 
MNA Local #125 received two letters from Alberta indicating that that it had 
insufcient information to determine “whether there is a credible assertion that 
FCM [Local] is a rights-bearing Métis community,” therefore, the Crown’s duty 
to consult was not triggered (the Decision).101 In response, the Local brought 
an application for judicial review, challenging the Decision. Justice Goss of the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench heard the judicial review in May 2016 and 
rendered her decision and reasons for judgement in December 2016. 
Importantly, the court was not asked to make determinations on the 
existence, scope, or infringement of any Métis rights in the region protected 
by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Te case was only about whether 
a credible assertion of rights by MNA Local #125 had been made, sufcient to 
trigger Crown consultation obligations.102 MNA Local #125 asked the court to 
do two things: frst, declare that Alberta’s decision was incorrect and breached 
the honour of the Crown; and second, order that Alberta be required to consult 
and accommodate the Local regarding the Teck Project prior to the Project being 
approved or constructed. 
2. WHAT THE COURT HELD IN FORT CHIPEWYAN 
Te SCC’s three-part legal test for triggering the Crown’s duty to consult (known 
as the Haida test) requires that Aboriginal claimants establish the following: 
(1) the Crown has knowledge of an actual or asserted Aboriginal right; (2) the 
Crown contemplates conduct that has the potential to afect that right; and 
(3) the contemplated Crown conduct could adversely impact the actual or 
asserted right.103 
In applying the Haida test in relation to “claims of unorganized Aboriginal 
collectives,” in which the court included Métis communities who may not yet 
have their governance structures formally recognized by the Crown,104 Justice 
Goss held she also needed to determine whether there was credible evidence on 
two additional threshold questions: (1) are MNA Local #125’s members part of 
a rights-bearing Métis community (i.e., do its members meet the requirements 
100. Tis history is summarized in Fort Chipewyan. Ibid at paras 5-70. 
101. Ibid at paras 60, 69. 
102. Ibid at para 109. 
103. Haida, supra note 20 at para 35. 
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set out in Powley)? And (2) have the members of the rights-bearing Métis 
community authorized MNA Local #125 to represent it for the purposes of 
Crown consultation?105 
In so doing, the court modifed the Haida test for triggering the Crown’s 
duty to consult Métis communities by adding these two additional requirements 
to the frst branch of the Haida test. According to the court’s reformulated version 
of the frst branch, a Métis claimant must establish the Crown has knowledge 
of an actual or asserted right of a Métis community, and this requires credible 
evidence that a rights-bearing Métis community can be established based on 
the Powley test. And so the frst, newly added requirement asks whether there 
is credible evidence that the members of the organization asserting the right 
meet the provisions of the Powley test (i.e., they must self-identify as Métis, 
they must have an ancestral connection to the historic Métis community that 
grounds the rights assertion, and they must be accepted by the community). 
Te second, newly added requirement asks whether there is credible evidence 
that these Métis rights-holders authorized the organization for the purposes of 
Crown consultation.106 
In order to justify the need for these additional requirements in the Métis 
context, the court repeatedly relied on the following proposition from the Alberta 
Court of Appeal:107 
… [t]here is nothing ironic or improper about jealously guarding entrenched 
constitutional rights, and ensuring that only those truly entitled are allowed to assert 
those rights. Tose who do enjoy such rights are entitled to expect that their rights 
will not be watered down by the recognition of unentitled claimants. 
I. THE COURT FOUND THE FORT CHIPEWYAN MÉTIS HAD A PRIMA FACIE 
HARVESTINg RIgHT ClAIM 
Based on the “sparse and somewhat vague”108 record put forward by MNA Local 
#125, the court found that “the existence of an identifable Métis community 
with a distinctive collective identity, living together in the same geographic area 
and sharing a common way of life, has not been demonstrated with a sufcient 
degree of continuity and stability to support a site-specifc Aboriginal right.”109 
105. Ibid at paras 341, 391. 
106. Ibid. 
107. L’Hirondelle v Alberta (Sustainable Resource Development), 2013 ABCA 12 at para 39 
[L’Hirondelle]. 
108. Fort Chipewyan, supra note 19 at para 354. 
109. Ibid. 









After reaching this conclusion based on evidence put forward by MNA Local 
#125, however, the court went on to consider the signifcance of the 2007 Métis 
Harvesting Policy. 
In assessing the implications of Alberta’s policy, the court acknowledged that 
the duty to consult is triggered at a “low, even very low”110 threshold based on 
the SCC’s jurisprudence that recognizes even “[t]enous claims, for which a strong 
prima facie case is absent” are sufcient to trigger the duty.111 Alberta submitted 
that its 2007 Harvesting Policy “does not contain a formal recognition of the listed 
communities [but rather] expressly states that the communities will be considered 
for the purposes of Métis harvesting [and] does not relate to consultation with 
Métis.”112 Despite this submission, the court held it would “assume that Alberta’s 
Métis Harvesting Policy does provide some evidence to establish on a prima facie 
basis that the Fort Chipewyan Métis Community is a rights-bearing community 
within a 160 km radius of Fort Chipewyan.”113 
Tis important (and, in my opinion, correct) determination by Justice Goss 
that the original frst branch of the duty to consult test could be satisfed by the 
2007 Harvesting Policy should have warranted at least a discussion by the court as 
to whether Alberta had demonstrated any eforts to work with the Métis in order 
to ascertain who should be consulted as the Métis rights-holder or an authorized 
representative of the rights-holder. It must be remembered that the duty to 
consult is the Crown’s duty owing to rights-bearing Aboriginal communities. 
While Aboriginal rights and the associated Crown duties fowing from them 
should be “jealously guard[ed],”114 there is a corollary duty to ascertain, or at least 
make some eforts to determine, who those constitutional rights-holders are. 
Te role of government should not be to merely sit back and deny the existence 
of its duty. Tis turns the fact that it is the Crown’s duty on its head, placing 
the full onus for implementing the duty (even after a credibly asserted right has 
been accommodated or established) on Aboriginal communities. Tis cannot be. 
Once the Crown or a court has recognized there is a credibly asserted right in a 
given area, the onus must shift, and the Crown must have at least some positive 
obligation to, at the very least, try to determine who needs to be consulted, if not 
engage in negotiations on these matters. 
110. Ibid at para 90. 
111. Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at para 40. 
112. Fort Chipewyan, supra note 19 at para 272. 
113. Ibid at para 365. 
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Put another way, when a prima facie rights claim has been made out, there is 
a consequential duty that falls on the Crown to at least try to determine to whom 
the duty is owed. Tis duty cannot be orphaned or ignored by the Crown because 
governments have a legacy of not recognizing and respecting Métis governance 
structures such as the MNA. Tis inaction is particularly unacceptable when 
there are longstanding Métis governance structures, on-the-ground, that are 
asking for Crown consultation and willing to come to the table. A “sit on your 
hands” and “wait-and-see” approach, where the Crown unilaterally decides when 
and how to assess whether groups that come forward are the rights-holder or 
authorized representative, does not uphold the honour of the Crown or positive 
obligations that fow from the duty to consult. Moreover, this type of situation 
(i.e., where the court has recognized a right by accommodating it, but there is no 
rights-holders the Crown recognizes) seems to be the exact type of situation where 
“a context-specifc duty to negotiate when Aboriginal rights are engaged.”115 
II. THE COURT FOUND THE MNA LOCAL #125 WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO 
REPRESENT THE FORT CHIPEWYAN MÉTIS COMMUNITY 
Te court then went on to consider the two additional requirements it added to 
the Haida test for Métis communities: whether MNA Local #125 represented the 
Fort Chipewyan Métis community. After considering the evidence provided by 
MNA Local #125 about its members and membership criteria, the court concluded 
that that it had not demonstrated that the Local’s members were members of a 
rights-bearing Métis community, however defned.116 Te court went on to also 
make the point it did not accept MNA Local #125’s attempts to describe itself as 
being interchangeable with the Fort Chipewyan Métis community.117 
Te conclusion that MNA Local #125 was not interchangeable with the Fort 
Chipewyan Métis community was not in itself fatal to the Local’s case. Te court 
restated previous direction from the SCC that Aboriginal groups, including Métis 
communities, can authorize “organizations” to represent them for the purposes 
of asserting section 35 rights and engaging in Crown consultation.118 Te court, 
therefore, asked whether MNA Local #125 was so authorized and set out the 
test for this authorization as follows: “[T]he legal entity whose source of authority 
and nature of its representation are demonstrably determinable would have the 
115. Daniels, supra note 3 at para 56. 
116. Fort Chipewyan, supra note 19 at paras 358-59. 
117. Ibid at para 421. 
118. Ibid at para 75. 












appropriate legal standing to speak for the Fort Chipewyan Métis Community 
that is the Aboriginal collective right-bearer.”119 
Te court provided examples of other “Métis organizations” that had 
satisfed this test in other litigation,120 but concluded it was unable to come to a 
similar conclusion with respect to MNA Local #125 based on the record before 
it.121 Te court suggested that one way MNA Local #125 could have shown 
that it was properly authorized to conduct consultations would have been for 
such authorization to be explicit in its bylaws.122 In this case, however, MNA 
Local #125’s bylaws were not even included in the evidence (nor were the MNA 
bylaws).123 In order to further bolster its conclusion that MNA Local #125 was 
not properly authorized by the Fort Chipewyan Métis community, the court 
also noted the apparent gap between the actual membership of the Local and 
the estimated population of the rights-bearing Métis community (a population 
estimate that MNA Local #125 itself provided).124 
Te court then went on to consider arguments made by Alberta as to 
why it should not have to consult with any Métis whatsoever when there are 
potential competing claims and the possibility of inefcient consultation eforts. 
In particular, allegations of potential disagreements between the MNA, its 
Regional Councils and Locals, which were not directly before the court in this 
case, were relied upon to come to the following conclusion:125 
In a situation where the MNA, MNA Region 1, and the FCM Local purport to 
represent the Aboriginal rights holding Métis of Fort Chipewyan with respect to 
consultation, it is obvious that ascertaining who speaks for the Métis in asserting 
Aboriginal rights and seeking Crown consultation becomes a critical issue to be 
resolved. As such, this Court agrees with the Alberta Crown’s submission that it 
would amount to a waste of resources for the Alberta Crown to potentially have 
to consult with several separate organizations who state that they represent smaller 
119. Ibid at para 397. 
120. Ibid at paras 374-75. 
121. Ibid at paras 421-23. 
122. Ibid at para 422. 
123. For a discussion of the jurisprudence pertaining to the authorization required to represent a 
rights-bearing Aboriginal people, see Drake, supra note 50 at 10-15. 
124. Fort Chipewyan, supra note 19 at para 411. In my opinion, the use of these census numbers 
in this way is problematic as they often rely on self-identifcation alone and fail to accurately 
capture or identify only those individuals who would meet the test set out in Powley for 
identifying Métis section 35 rights-holders, which in addition to self-identifcation as Métis 
requires, among other things, factors such as acceptance by a modern-day Métis community 
and connection to a historic Métis community. 
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or larger subsets of the same group in respect of the same interests and the same 
project. It is efcient and justifable for the Alberta Crown to seek some assurance 
that it is consulting with the authorized representative of an Aboriginal collective. 
With respect, this conclusion is simply wrong based on Powley, the duty to 
negotiate, and Haida. Essentially, the court concludes that potentially conficting 
Métis representation claims (even though none were before the court in this case) 
may be used as a justifcation by Crown governments to deny Crown consultation 
with any Métis. Te perverse nature of the court’s logic is especially striking when 
one considers that the Crown’s own inaction and reluctance to recognize Métis 
governance structures over the generations contributes to any conficting claims. 
Tis is the very defnition of a government sitting on its hands and relying on 
its own inaction to deny a duty fowing from a constitutionally protected Métis 
right. As discussed above, the SCC in Powley slayed this rights-denial dragon 
nearly two decades ago when it held that “the difculty of identifying members 
of the Métis community must not be exaggerated as a basis for defeating their 
rights under the Constitution of Canada.”126 Similarly, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Powley held that, “[t]he government cannot simply sit on its hands 
and then defend its inaction because the nature of the right or the identity of 
the bearers of the [Métis] right is uncertain.”127 And yet, this Métis rights-denial 
dragon rises again, but in an even more absurd form because there is no even a 
blanket denial of the right based on the 2007 Harvesting Policy. Ultimately, the 
court concluded that MNA Local #125 was not authorized to represent the Fort 
Chipewyan Métis community. 
Te court also held the duty to consult was not triggered because the third 
branch of the Haida test was not satisfed. According to the court, the record did 
not disclose “how the Project would potentially impact the collective Aboriginal 
rights asserted by the entire Fort Chipewayan Métis Community.”128 Tus, the 
court dismissed the Local’s judicial review application in its entirety.129 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORT CHIPEWYAN CASE 
Since its release at the end of 2016, Fort Chipewyan has, naturally, been embraced 
by Alberta and derided by the Métis. Te case has bolstered Alberta’s astonishing 
record of not engaging in a single consultation for over sixteen years with the 
126. Powley, supra note 1 at para 49. 
127. Powley (2001), supra note 40. 
128. Fort Chipewyan, supra note 19 at para 451. 
129. Ibid at paras 476-77. 






MNA, who is the federally recognized representative of the Métis Nation within 
Alberta and whom Canada consults with.130 
Fort Chipewyan has also informed the development of Alberta’s Métis 
Credible Assertion Policy, which was publicly released in December 2019.131 Tis 
new policy encourages “Métis organizations” to apply to Alberta, which will then 
assess whether it will recognize the organization as representative of a rights-bearing 
Métis community. Te policy rests on the incorrect legal assumption, validated 
by the court in Fort Chipewyan, that applicants are required to prove to Alberta 
that they are representative of a rights-bearing Métis community prior to Alberta 
being required to engage in any consultation, as opposed to Alberta having any 
positive obligation or role to fgure out who represents Métis whose harvesting 
rights have already been acknowledged and accommodated through provincial 
harvesting policies. 
In September 2019, Alberta cancelled all discussions with the MNA with 
respect to developing a Métis Consultation Policy and now solely relies on its 
Métis Credible Assertion Policy to address of-Settlement Métis consultation 
issues in the province. Tis cancellation came after the MNA had signed a 
harvesting agreement with Alberta in March 2019 that implements Alberta’s 
new 2019 Métis Harvesting Policy (developed in collaboration with the 
MNA and that, as outlined above, recognizes the MNA’s ability to issue Métis 
Harvester Identifcation Stickers to its eligible citizens and thus to have a role in 
implementing the policy). Te inexplicable result is as follows: Métis harvesting 
rights are accommodated at a regional level throughout most of the province; the 
MNA is authorized to represent the vast number of eligible Métis harvesters for 
the purposes of Crown consultation based on its bylaws and has a verifed Métis 
registry identifying these Métis harvesters; yet, Alberta continues to refuse to 
consult with the MNA, its Regional Councils, or its Locals. 
In response, in March 2020, the MNA fled an application seeking judicial 
review of Alberta’s decision to cancel negotiations with it about developing 
a Métis Consultation Policy based on a breach of the honour of the Crown, 
including the duty to negotiate.132 
130. MGRSA, supra note 15. 
131. “Métis Credible Assertion: Process and Criteria” (13 December 2019), online (pdf ): 
Government of Alberta <open.alberta.ca/dataset/e74ec17c-9cf6-4f2c-8dde-1cae21ae6b0c/ 
resource/19a86947-5798-46e3-a150-a436ccfb2f6a/download/ir-metis-credible-asssertion. 
pdf> [perma.cc/E37H-NHV9]. 
132. MNA v Alberta (Minister of Indigenous Relations and Minister of Justice and Solicitor General)
(5 March 2020), Edmonton, Alta QB 2003-04935 (originating application for judicial 
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Fortunately, at the time of writing this article, the re-emergence of this Métis 
rights-denial dragon seems to be limited to Alberta. In other provinces, where 
Métis harvesting rights have been established, recognized, or accommodated 
through negotiated agreements with the Crown, provincial governments at least 
attempt to, or do, consult with the Métis governments who are signatories to 
those agreements. With that said, dragons know how to fy and the purpose of 
this article is to outline why this dragon, in mutated form, cannot spread and will 
hopefully be slayed—again—in future litigation on Métis consultation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In Powley, the SCC slayed the most duplicitous of the Métis rights-denial dragons 
that uncertainty in the relation to the identifcation of Métis rights-holders or 
competing Métis representative claims could be used as a justifcation to deny 
Métis section 35 rights. Tis dragon had resulted in wholesale denial of all Métis 
rights for generations, and could not be sustained if section 35 was to have any 
meaning for the Métis. Te SCC confrmed that when credibly asserted or 
established rights claims were engaged, the Crown was burdened with positive 
obligations to negotiate. Seventeen years later, several agreements on Métis 
harvesting rights demonstrate this was not an impossible task. 
Increasingly in modern Canadian Aboriginal law, however, the search for the 
“proper rights-holder” is becoming a way to potentially limit or completely deny 
Aboriginal rights protected by section 35. In efect, constitutionally protected 
Aboriginal rights in section 35 (proven and unproven) have the potential 
to be hollow if there is no rights-holder who can access these rights. Te Fort 
Chipewyan case is an example of how a previously slayed Métis rights-denial 
dragon has re-emerged in a legally unsound way in the context of Crown–Métis 
consultation. Indigenous peoples as well as the courts must be vigilant to ensure 
that the Crown’s positive duties fowing from section 35 are met. Tis will require 
collaborative eforts and solutions to ensure that rights-holders are identifed 
and that this rights-denial dragon does not become a way to delay or deny the 
recognition of Métis rights. 
